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Data mining is quite common in econometric modeling when a given dataset is applied multiple 
times for the purpose of inference; it in turn could bias inference. Given the existence of data 
mining, it is likely that any reported investment performance is simply due to random chance (luck). 
This study develops a time-series bootstrapping simulation method to distinguish skill from luck in 
the investment process. Empirically, we find little evidence showing that investment strategies 
based on UK analyst recommendation revisions can generate statistically significant abnormal 
returns. Our rolling window based bootstrapping simulations confirm that the reported insignificant 
portfolio performance is due to sell-side analysts’ lack of skill in making valuable stock 
recommendations, rather than their bad luck, irrespective of whether they work for more 
prestigious brokerage houses or not. 
Keywords 




An interesting question of financial economics is whether the reported investment 
performance is as a result of random chance (luck), or data mining, which is considered to be a 
dangerous econometric practice that should be avoided (see, White, 2000; Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols, and Trueman, 2001). Despite the nonexistence of a solid intrinsic relationship, 
extensive tests on a given set of sample frequently indicate some empirical results that seem to be 
superior, but actually spurious. Since the 1970s, a substantial number of methodological 
approaches have been proposed to test the spurious relationship generated by data mining in the 
context of specification searches, with particular attention being paid to the issue of inference (see, 
e.g., White, 2000). However, very few methods are applicable for examining the null hypothesis 
that the observed superior performance during a specification test has no predictive superiority over 
a given benchmark model.  
Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006) develop a cross-sectional 
bootstrapping simulation method on mutual funds research, which resamples the residuals from 
individual fund returns independently, but remains the effect of common risk factors fixed 
historically. Fama and French (2010, p. 1940), however, argue that “failure to account for the joint 
distribution of fund returns, and of fund and explanatory returns, biases the inferences of Kosowski 
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et al. (2006) toward positive performance”. Extending Kosowski et al. (2006), Fama and French 
(2010) jointly resample both the residuals and risk factors, ceteris paribus. Inspired by Kosowski et 
al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010), this study develops a rolling window based bootstrapping 
simulation method in attempts to distinguish luck from skill in the investment process. Note that 
our method measures the performance distribution of the best performing rolling windows not only 
by resampling from the distribution of the ex-post best performing rolling windows, but using the 
information about luck represented by all rolling windows. This is a major difference between our 
method and those employed in previous studies, which generally ignore the possibility that luck 
distribution encountered by all other performance distributions also provides highly valuable and 
relevant information (see, e.g., White, 2000; Cuthbertson, Nitzsche, and O’Sullivan, 2008). Our 
rolling window based bootstrapping simulation method thus allows for a comprehensive 
investigation into the time-varying performance after explicitly controlling for luck and alleviating 
the potential bias from misspecification. 
As an empirical demonstration, this study applies the time-series bootstrapping simulation 
method to investment strategies based on sell-side analyst recommendation revisions, though our 
method can be applied in evaluating other time-varying investment performance. Specifically, 
using a large sample of UK sell-side analyst recommendation revisions over the period January 
1997 to June 2013, we construct a long portfolio, including all upgrades to buy-related 
recommendations from previous sell-related recommendations, as well as a short portfolio, 
including all downgrades to sell-related recommendations from previous buy-related 
recommendations. The time-varying performance of the long and short portfolios is measured by 
the intercept derived from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model on a rolling window 
basis.  
We find that the abnormal returns to the long and short portfolios are not statistically 
significant at the conventional level in any period of time, the results of which are robust to 
alternative asset pricing models, e.g., the single-factor capital assets pricing model (CAPM), the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. Our time-
series bootstrapping simulation methods further confirm that the reported insignificant portfolio 
performance is due to sell-side analysts’ lack of skill in making valuable stock recommendation 
revisions, rather than their bad luck, no matter whether they work for more prestigious brokerage 
houses or not. From an investment perspective, it seems to be unlikely for market participants to 
make profits by purchasing (or short selling) stocks with upward (or downward) recommendation 
revisions in the UK.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews two strands 
of related literature on various methods to address the problem of data mining and on sell-side 
analyst research. Section 55.3 describes data and methodology, while Section 55.4 presents 
empirical and simulated results. The final section concludes. 
 
55.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
55.2.1 An overview of various methods to address the problem of data mining 
A number of tests have been conducted in assessing whether the reported investment 
performance is actually due to data mining, for example, (i) the out-of-sample persistence test, (ii) 
the conventional bootstrapping and Monte Carlo simulations, and (iii) the cross-sectional 
bootstrapping simulations developed by Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010), and 
so on. 
55.2.1.1 Out-of-sample persistence tests 
Numerous studies on portfolio performance evaluation account for luck by using the out-of-
sample persistence test in the spirit of Carhart (1997). Carhart (1997) sorts mutual funds into the 
winner and loser portfolios based on the lagged one-year returns and examine the short-term 
persistence as shown in Lakonishok et al. (1992), Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1996). Carhart (1997) attributes 
the short-term persistence to price momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), while little evidence 
is consistent with skilled or informed mutual fund managers. The rationale behind the out-of-
sample persistence test is that, if investors really possess skill or information advantages over the 
market, the superior performance should be persistent and reflected in the out-of-sample period as 
well (see, also, Neely, Weller, and Ulrich, 2009); otherwise, the superior performance could 
disappear in the out-of-sample period, if investors are lucky. The out-of-sample persistence test 
generally rejects the hypothesis of data mining in the financial literature on the profitability of the 
simple technical trading rules in the stock market (see, Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron, 1992; 
Hudson, Dempsey, and Keasey, 1996) and in the foreign currency market (see, Okunev and White, 
2003; Olson, 2004; Neely et al., 2009).  
Although the out-of-sample persistence test is quite popular, it underestimates the likelihood 
that luck (either good luck or bad luck) can also be persistent, as the allocation of subsamples (such 
as the winner and loser portfolios) is largely based on noises (see, Kosowski et al., 2006; Fama and 
French, 2010). In addition, the subsamples may not be directly comparable, as the separation of the 
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whole sample is somewhat arbitrary and thus lacks the expected objectivity (see, Hsu and Kuan, 
2005). Several theoretical hypotheses challenge the rationale of the out-of-sample persistence test. 
For example, Berk and Green (2004) make a theoretical argument that the performance persistence 
should not exist, that is, the historical performance should not predict the future performance. 
Focusing on rational investors who optimally invest among passive and active assets, Berk and 
Green (2004) argue that successful fund managers will capture abnormal returns by raising fees; 
alternatively, the size of their funds will increase and abnormal returns will disappear and 
deteriorate predictability, due to the diseconomies of scale, such as the higher transaction costs, or 
due to the needs of including the poorer-performing assets. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2012), 
however, reject most of the predictions made by Berk and Green (2004). Specifically, they show 
that the best-performing funds reduce fees and the poor-performing funds raise fees, since 
management fee schedules generally decrease with the size of funds and the administrative costs 
have a high fixed component. Elton et al. (2012) document the performance persistence, that is, the 
historical performance predicts the future performance up to a three-year holding period. They also 
find that expense ratios are relatively lower for large funds and decrease as the funds become larger 
and/or perform better. 
In the recent years, the literature on the performance persistence for hedge funds has 
emerged, mainly focusing on the US market where the industry is quite mature, while the results 
remain mixed and inconclusive. For example, using a sample of 399 offshore funds over the period 
1989 to 1995, Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) are among the first to report the positive 
risk-adjusted returns, though they find little evidence of the performance persistence in the raw 
returns or in the style-adjusted returns (see, also, Kat and Menexe, 2003). However, taking into 
account non-surviving hedge funds over the period 1995 to 1997, Kouwenberg (2003) provides 
clear evidence of the performance persistence (see, also, Harri and Brorsen, 2004). Agarwal and 
Naik (2001) test the performance persistence for hedge funds with the use of various measurement 
periods, i.e., the quarterly, semi-annual, and annual intervals, showing the maximum performance 
persistence at the quarterly intervals. Baquero, Horst, and Verbeek (2005) also find the 
performance persistence for a total of 1,797 hedge funds in the quarterly returns; further evidence 
shows that the performance can be persistent in the long-term period. Consistently, based on the 
monthly returns of 1,665 hedge funds, Edwards and Caglayan (2001) report that over a quarter of 
these funds generate positive excess returns, and, most notably, such significant performance 
persists over the one- and two-year horizons.  
Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004) show that sell-side analysts exhibit relative persistence 
in their stock recommendations, that is, sell-side analysts making more (less) profitable stock 
recommendations in the past tend to make more (less) profitable stock recommendations in the 
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future. In particular, the market recognizes the performance persistence in the five days 
surrounding sell-side analyst recommendation revisions. However, the market reaction is 
incomplete, as trading strategies taking the long (short) positions in upgrades (downgrades) based 
on sell-side analysts’ prior performance become unprofitable after accounting for transaction costs 
and trading delays. In contrast, Li (2005) documents that sell-side analysts with the above-median 
risk adjusted performance in the estimation period (i.e., the past winners) consistently outperform 
their counterparts with below-median performance (i.e., the past losers) in the subsequent holding 
periods. Specifically, the annualized risk adjusted returns of trading strategies based on the 
performance persistence are statistically and economically significant, even after taking transaction 
costs and trading delays into account. For example, the annualized abnormal returns, with an 
approximate magnitude of 10%, are substantially higher than those typically reported in mutual 
funds research, presenting a clear violation against the semi-strong form of market efficiency. The 
significantly positive relationship between the historical performance and the future performance is 
also supported by Loh and Mian (2006), Ertimur, Sunder, and Sunder (2007), Brown and Huang 
(2013), and Fang and Yasuda (2014). 
55.2.1.2 The conventional bootstrapping and Monte Carlo simulations 
Although numerous empirical studies support the predictive power of technical trading rules 
(see, e.g., Brown, Goetzmann, and Kumar, 1998; Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang, 2000; Savin, Weller, 
and Zvingelis, 2007; Hsu, Hsu, and Kuan, 2010; among others), such predictive power is likely as a 
result of data mining, that is, the observed any satisfactory results may simply be obtained by 
random chance (luck). Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999, p. 1648) argue that data mining 
can “result from a subtle survivorship bias operating on the entire universe of technical trading 
rules that have been considered historically.” White (2000) employs a straightforward procedure to 
test the null hypothesis that there is no a superior strategy (or model specification) in a “universe” 
of strategies (or model specifications). However, it is cumbersome to test the hypothesis when the 
“universe” of strategies is large. White (2000) thus proposes a reality check test to adjust the 
significance level of the estimated t-statistics in the face of possible data mining (see, also, Sullivan 
et al., 1999). By setting the strategy of zero return at all times as the benchmark, White (2000) 
suggests the use of the block resampling estimator of Politis and Romano (1994), either the 
stationary bootstrapping simulation or Monte Carlo simulation, to estimate the p-value of a given 
trading strategy (or model specification). 
Brock et al. (1992) conduct a comprehensive study using the daily stock prices over a 90-
year sample period, showing that a total of 26 technical trading rules applied to the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) Index significantly beat the benchmark. Sullivan et al. (1999) examine 
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the results of Brock et al. (1992) by applying a bootstrapping reality check over the same sample 
period, confirming that the results are not due to data mining. However, the “universe” of trading 
strategies in Sullivan et al. (1999) is far from complete, as some well-known strategy classes are 
not included. Moreover, the distribution of White’s (2000) reality check is based on the least 
favorable configuration, which is referred to as the point least favorable to the alternative (Hsu and 
Kuan, 2005). Hansen (2005) finds that the power of White’s (2000) reality check test can be driven 
to zero by adding sufficient poor or irrelevant trading rules to the “universe” being tested; also, 
White’s (2000) reality check does not use the standardized t-statistics. To overcome these 
limitations, Hansen (2005) develops a more powerful test for the superior predictive ability (SPA) 
by using a different way to bootstrap the distribution of the standardized returns. Using Hansen’s 
(2005) SPA test, Hansen, Lunde, and Nason (2005) find significant calendar effect, which is 
against the results of Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (2001) based on White’s (2000) reality 
check test. Hsu and Kuan (2005) investigate the profitability of technical trading rules using both 
White’s (2000) reality check test and Hansen’s (2005) SPA test. They report significantly 
profitable simple and complex trading strategies in the sample from relatively young indices, such 
as the NASDAQ Composite Index and the Russell 2000 Index, but not in the sample from more 
mature indices, such as the DJIA Index and the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 Index. Using 
White’s (2000) reality check test, Qi and Wu (2006) examine 2,127 technical trading rules in the 
foreign exchange market and find that data mining biases do not change the profitability and 
statistical significance for the period April 2, 1973 to December 31, 1998.  
Romano and Wolf (2005) introduce a reality check based stepwise multiple test to identify 
the significant models that outperform the benchmark. Hsu et al. (2010) extend Hansen’s (2005) 
SPA test to a stepwise SPA test in attempts to identify the predictive models in the large-scale 
and multiple testing problems. They find that technical trading rules have significant predictive 
ability prior to the inception of exchange traded funds. As stated by Hansen (2005), the SPA test 
could be improved if there is a reliable way to incorporate information about the off-diagonal 
elements of the covariance matrix. Cai, Jiang, Zhang, and Zhang (2015) propose a new method to 
test the SPA of a benchmark model against a large group of alternative models, in attempts to 
reduce the potential data mining bias. Specifically, they model the covariance matrix by factor 
models and develop a generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) t-statistic. In various scenarios, it is 
shown that the GLR test has asymptotic null distribution independent of nuisance parameters. 
Also, the GLR test is asymptotically optimal in the sense that it achieves the optimal rate of 
convergence in the context of semi- and nonparametric settings (see, Jiang, Zhou, Jiang, and Peng, 
2007). The Monte Carlo bootstrapping simulation results show that the GLR test is much more 
powerful and less conservative than Hansen’s (2005) SPA test, possibly because the SPA test has 
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a non-unique null distribution depending on nuisance parameters. The GLR test is also extended 
to a stepwise GLR (step-GLR) test in the spirit of Romano and Wolf’s (2005) step-reality check 
test and Hsu et al.’s (2010) step-SPA test, allowing to sequentially identify the models that are 
superior to the benchmark. The modeling of the covariance matrix is semiparametric in nature, as 
it does not require distributional assumptions. The step-GLR test can identify the most 
contributed predictive models to the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
However, data mining becomes much more serious in the more recent period, as the reality 
check test examines investment performance by resampling from the distribution of a given sample 
only, without using the information about luck represented by all other return samples. Hence, 
White’s (2000) reality check test discounts the possibility that luck distribution encountered by all 
other performance distributions also contains highly useful and relevant information (Cuthbertson 
et al., 2008).  
55.2.1.3 The alternative bootstrapping simulations 
Kosowski et al. (2006) develop a cross-sectional bootstrapping simulation method on mutual 
funds research, which resamples the residuals from a large number of time-series individual fund 
returns independently, but remains the effect of common risk factors fixed historically. Fama and 
French (2010), however, jointly resample both of them, as Kosowski et al. (2006) fail to account 
for the joint distribution of fund returns, and of fund and explanatory returns, and inevitably bias 
the inference toward positive performance. Both simulation methods do not impose an assumption 
that returns follow any specific parametric distribution, nor do they depend on the large sample 
asymptotic theory; the inference allows for non-normality in the idiosyncratic risk of returns 
(Cuthbertson et al., 2008; Sørensen 2009). Specifically, examining 1,788 mutual funds over the 
period January 1975 to December 2002, Kosowski et al. (2006) find that a sizable minority of fund 
managers have superior ability in selecting stocks even netting of all expenses and transaction costs. 
Cuthbertson et al. (2008) apply the bootstrapping simulation method of Kosowski et al. (2006) to 
935 UK mutual funds from April 1975 to December 2002, and find similar evidence of superior 
stock picking ability among a small number of the best performing fund manangers. In contrast, 
using an alternative bootstrapping simulation method, Fama and French (2010) examine 5,238 
mutual funds over the period January 1984 to September 2006, showing little evidence of superior 
skill for fund manangers. 
However, the empirical results of Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) are 
not directly comparable, given three main differences, i.e., (i) the different fund-inclusion criteria, 
(ii) the different sample periods, and (iii) the different bootstraping simulation methods––Kosowski 
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et al. (2006) simulate fund returns and factor returns independently, while Fama and French (2010) 
simulate these returns jointly. Blake, Caulfield, Ioannidis, and Tonks (2017) apply both 
bootstrapping simulation methods of Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) to the 
same sample of UK mutual funds over the period January 1998 to September 2008. Given that the 
stock picking skills of fund managers evaluated by Jensen’s (1968) alpha could be biased in the 
presence of market timing skills (see, Treynor and Mazuy, 1966), Blake et al. (2017) incorporate 
the total performance measure of Grinblatt and Titman (1994)––the sum of Jensen’s (1968) alpha 
and market-timing coefficients––into the bootstrapping simulation methods. Blake et al. (2017) 
find that the evaluation of investment performance relies heavily on the bootstrapping simulation 
methods employed. Specifically, the simulation method of Kosowski et al. (2006) is more likely to 
find superior skill than that of Fama and French (2010). On the contrary, Gallefoss, Hansen, 
Haukaas, and Molnár (2015) argue that the bootstrapping simulation methods of Kosowski et al. 
(2006) and Fama and French (2010) generate basically the same results (see, also, Su, Zhang, 
Bangassa, and Joseph, 2018). In order to enhance the precision of performance predictability, 
Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) incorporate the seemingly unrelated assets Bayesian approach of 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2002), which is robust to model misspecification, into the bootstrapping 
simulation method of Kosowski et al. (2006). More importantly, it takes advantage of information 
in the seemingly unrelated assets to overcome the short sample period problems and to improve the 
precision of the performance estimates. They find that the top hedge fund managers possess certain 
asset selection skill and can take advantage of the simple trading strategies, the results of which 
challenge the classical point of view that the top hedge funds are just lucky and their performance 
could not be persistent. 
Blake, Caulfield, Ioannidis, and Tonks (2014) argue that the non-parametric bootstrapping 
simulation methods of Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) are flawed as the 
returns are drawn from a uniform distribution.1 To alleviate the limitations of the non-parametric 
bootstrapping simulations, Blake et al., (2014) suggest the application of the parametric 
bootstrapping simulations, in which the time-series returns for each fund are resampled from a 
stable distribution that shows the distributional properties of the realized returns over the whole 
sample period. For example, to identify the underlying distribution of alphas, Meyer, Schmoltzi, 
Stammschulte, Kaesler, Loos, and Hackethal (2012) draw a new alpha that is added to the return 
series for each portfolio and for each simulation run. The distribution of alphas is drawn from pre-
specified distribution, such as normal distributions with negative means and slightly skewed 
normal distributions with a bit of fat tails. Before adding the drawn alphas to the return series, 
                                                             
1 Specifically, the non-parametric bootstrapping simulation methods give excessive weights to observations 
in the tail of the true, but unknown distribution and will underestimate the probability of appearing in the 
center of the distribution. Moreover, it ignores the skewness and kurtosis in the underlying fund returns data. 
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Meyer et al. (2012) rescale alphas by the ratio of the residual standard errors of individual portfolio 
to the average standard error of all portfolios. This rescaling process accounts for the issue that 
more diversified portfolios are less able to produce extreme alphas than less diversified portfolios. 
It also captures the fact that portfolios with the same level of diversification have different 
probabilities to generate large alphas, according to their risk. However, a potential problem of the 
parametric bootstrapping simulation methods is that any cross-sectional dependence is lost (see, 
Kapetanios, 2008). Moreover, Cogneau and Zakamouline (2013) suggest that the widely used 
block bootstrapping simulation methods are generally biased. An improper application of the block 
bootstrapping simulation method could underestimate the risk of a portfolio with the independent 
time-varying returns and overestimate the risk of a portfolio with the mean-reverting returns. 
Blake et al. (2014) introduce two new simulation methods allowing for appropriate inference 
in the presence of the non-normal asset returns when evaluating the performance of mutual funds 
against the benchmark model. Specifically, one simulation method recognizes the panel nature of 
the dataset and the existence of both fund and time effects, while the other one takes into account 
the non-normal distribution of individual mutual fund returns. Blake et al. (2014) find little 
evidence that UK fund managers can generate superior abnormal returns when the non-normality 
of fund returns using a series of both parametric and non-parametric bootstrapping simulations is 
allowed. 
55.2.1.4 Other simulation methods 
Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) propose an alternative model to distinguish skilled 
(unskilled) funds from lucky (unlucky) funds. Specifically, they construct three groups of funds, 
i.e., skilled funds, zero-alpha funds, and unskilled funds, and then use the false discovery rate 
approach proposed by Storey (2002) to study the distribution of p-values on the sampled t-statistics. 
Novy-Marx and Velikov (2016) suggest the use of before- and after-transaction cost performance 
of financial anomalies to examine data mining. Transaction costs significantly reduce strategy 
profitability, increasing data mining concerns, in line with Barber et al. (2001) and Timmermann 
and Granger (2004). 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) suggest testing market anomalies with the use 
of the sophisticated asset pricing models. Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014) argue that nearly half of 80 
financial anomalies earn insignificant and average returns for the high-minus-low (HML) deciles 
constructed with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) breakpoints and value-weighted returns, 
consistent with McLean and Pontiff (2014). Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2017) report that over 100 out 
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of 161 financial anomalies can be explained by the q-factor model of Hou et al. (2014), though they 
fail to account for transaction costs (Novy-Marx and Velikov, 2016).  
Overall, data mining has gained rising attention in the recent literature, especially in the buy-
side investment industry, such as mutual funds. However, none of the studies applies the Kosowski 
et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) bootstrapping simulations to a single time-series 
portfolio returns, to the best of our knowledge. Furthermore, it remains understudied whether the 
performance of sell-side analysts are lucky or skilful. 
55.2.2 A brief review of sell-side analyst research 
Sell-side analysts typically work for brokerage houses (or investment banks), collecting and 
analyzing a variety of market, industry, and firm-specific information and then making stock 
recommendations. These analyst recommendations are disseminated through television 
appearances or through other electronic and print media, and could be used by investors in their 
investment decisions. Whether sell-side analyst recommendations can truly create investment value 
and promote market efficiency has been of great interest to financial academics. The pioneering 
study of Cowles (1933) concludes that investors are not able to add value to the market when they 
follow analyst recommendations, confirmed by numerous early studies (see, e.g., Colker, 1963; 
Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum, and Lease, 1979). In contrast, two recent studies of Stickel (1995) 
and Womack (1996) report that upgrades (downgrades), i.e., favorable (unfavorable) changes in 
analyst recommendations, are accompanied by significantly positive (negative) returns at the time 
of their announcements.2 Barber et al. (2001), Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004), Boni and 
Womack (2006), and Green (2006) also show the existence of profitable investment strategies 
based on publicly available analyst recommendations, apparently against the semi-strong form of 
market efficiency. However, Barber et al. (2001) argue that these investment strategies require a 
great deal of trading and generate considerable transaction costs, suggesting that, although market 
inefficiencies exist, they are not easily exploitable by investors (see, also, Mikhail et al., 2004; Hall 
and Tacon, 2010). Altınkılıç and Hansen (2009) and Altınkılıç, Balashov, and Hansen (2013) 
further call into question the information role played by financial analysts in that their stock 
                                                             
2  The recent literature on sell-side analyst research shows that the investment value of analyst 
recommendations is significantly related to the frequency of analyst recommendation revisions (see, Hobbs, 
Kovacs, and Sharma, 2012), the conflict of interests (see, Mehran and Stulz, 2007; Shen and Chih, 2009; 
Guan, Lu, and Wong, 2012), the reputation of sell-side analysts (see, Emery and Li, 2009; Fang and Yasuda, 
2009 & 2014; Meng, 2015), momentum of analyst recommendations (see, Muslu and Xue, 2013), timing of 
reaction to analyst recommendations (see, Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004; Green, 2006; Irvine, Lipson, and 
Puckett, 2007), herding (see, Trueman, 1994; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010), industry (see, Jegadeesh and Kim, 
2006), time stamps reported in the database for analyst recommendations (see, Bradley, Clarke, Lee, and 
Ornthanalai, 2014), sell-side analysts’ industry experience (see, Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu, 2016), and so on. 
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recommendation revisions often piggyback on public information (e.g., corporate events and news), 
and thus provide investors with little incremental information. 
The value of sell-side analyst recommendations has been extensively studied in the US, 
while very few studies have been conducted in other markets. Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) point out 
that an in-depth examination in other developed markets will provide us with a more 
comprehensive picture. They report international evidence that stock prices react significantly to 
analyst recommendation revisions in the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized countries, except for 
Italy. In addition, Dimson and Fraletti (1986) examine an unpublished sample of 1,649 telephone 
recommendations made by a leading UK brokerage house in 1983, but they find no significant 
abnormal returns for the recommended stocks. Ryan and Taffler (2006; p. 372) argue that the study 
of Dimson and Fraletti (1986) examines analyst recommendations made by “a single UK brokerage 
house only” and could be biased towards large size stocks. Ryan and Taffler (2006) investigate a 
sample of 2,506 changes in analyst recommendations made by six London based brokerage houses 
over the period December 1993 to June 1995, showing that stock prices are significantly influenced 
by analyst recommendation revisions. Su et al. (2018) argue that the two prior UK studies with the 
use of the limited observations and short sample periods examined generally suffer from small 
sample bias. Su et al. (2018) conducts a comprehensive investigation into the investment value of 
sell-side analyst recommendation revisions in the UK, showing that, on average, upgrades fail to 
generate any significantly positive abnormal returns in any period of time, even before transaction 
costs. In addition, although downgrades could generate significantly negative abnormal gross 
returns over some periods of time, these observed significant returns disappear after accounting for 
transaction costs. However, an industry-based analysis shows that, within two high-tech industry 
sectors, i.e., Health Care and Technology sectors, sell-side analysts possess certain skill in making 
valuable downgrades over some periods of time and, in particular, such skill is sufficient to offset 
transaction costs. 
 
55.3 Data and Methodology 
55.3.1 Data and sample description 
We obtain the real-time UK sell-side analyst recommendations from the Morningstar 
Extracted Data File: Historic Broker Recommendations for UK Registered and UK Listed 
Companies, originally created by Hemscott Company Guru, now part of Morningstar Company 
Intelligence. Each analyst recommendation record contains information on the name of the 
recommended stock, the name of the brokerage house issuing the recommendation, the 
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recommendation starting and expiration dates, as well as a rating between 1 and 9.3 A rating of 1 
reflects a strong buy; 2, a buy; 3, a weak buy; 4, a weak buy/hold; 5, a hold; 6, a hold/sell; 7, a 
weak sell; 8, a sell; and 9, a strong sell.  
We exclude all stock recommendations that omit the name of brokerage houses and/or 
contain data errors. Also, we require that: (i) the gap between the starting and expiration dates of 
each recommendation is less than one year to ensure that the brokerage house actively follows the 
recommended stock (see, also., Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006; Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman, 2007); 
and (ii) the relevant financial and accounting data of the recommended stocks are available from 
the London Share Price Database (LSPD). The final sample is comprised of 294,692 stock 
recommendations made by 122 brokerage houses on 2,409 distinct firms listed either on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) or on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) over the period 
January 1997 to June 2013. Our sample includes 89,014 stock recommendations on 1,346 dead 
firms to avoid the potential survivorship bias (see more details on descriptive statistics on our final 
sample in Appendix 55A). 
55.3.2 Research design 
55.3.2.1 Portfolio construction 
We construct two portfolios: (i) a long portfolio, consisting of all upgrades to strong buy, 
buy, weak buy, or weak buy/hold from previous strong sell, sell, weak sell, hold/sell, or hold; and 
(ii) a short portfolio, consisting of all downgrades to strong sell, sell, weak sell, hold/sell, or hold 
from previous strong buy, buy, weak buy, or weak buy/hold.4 For each analyst recommendation 
revision, the recommended stock enters the long portfolio at the close of trading on the day the 
revision is released. If a revision is released on a non-trading day, the recommended stock is added 
into the long portfolio at the close of the next trading day. If a stock is recommended by more than 
one brokerage house on a given date, then that stock will appear multiple times in the portfolio on 
that date, once for each brokerage house. The portfolio is updated daily, so the recommended stock 
                                                             
3 Unlike Su et al. (2018) that reclassify all original analyst recommendations into five categories: Strong 
Buys, Buys, Holds, Sells, and Strong Sells, this study remains the nine categories, as the purpose of this 
study is to test the proposed bootstrapping simulation method rather than compare the investment value of 
analyst recommendations in the UK with studies in other markets. 
4 The short portfolio does not include downgrades from strong buy to buy, from strong buy to weak buy, 
from strong buy to weak buy/hold, from buy to weak buy, from buy to weak buy/hold, or from weak buy to 
weak buy/hold, as they can also be interpreted as positive recommendations, while the long portfolio does not 
include upgrades from strong sell to sell, from strong sell to weak sell, from strong sell to weak hold/sell, 
from strong sell to hold, from sell to weak sell, from sell to weak hold/sell, from sell to hold, from weak sell 
to weak hold/sell, from weak sell to hold, or from weak hold/sell to hold, as they can also be interpreted as 
negative recommendations (Stickel, 1995). 
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is removed from the portfolio at the close of the trading on the recommendation expiration date. 
The short portfolio is constructed in an anomalous daily fashion. 
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Table 55.1 Descriptive statistics on UK sell-side analyst recommendations in the long and short portfolios 
The long portfolio The short portfolio 
Year 
No. of recommended 
firms 






No. of recommended 
firms 






1997 889 45 2.15 12,546 736 43 5.45 10,500 
1998 940 47 2.19 12,758 752 42 5.55 10,207 
1999 904 45 2.20 11,822 713 39 5.54 8,328 
2000 849 50 2.19 10,412 622 44 5.43 6,330 
2001 844 45 2.21 7,715 680 41 5.65 7,205 
2002 822 43 2.19 7,311 647 41 5.80 6,319 
2003 771 47 2.20 8,964 649 41 5.78 7,333 
2004 800 49 2.20 10,537 638 47 5.70 8,383 
2005 883 49 2.19 10,087 682 48 5.74 9,363 
2006 921 54 2.15 10,715 665 47 5.72 7,751 
2007 903 49 2.14 8,574 620 41 5.67 5,556 
2008 893 50 2.11 9,065 586 47 5.84 5,844 
2009 804 51 2.12 9,593 564 51 5.79 6,527 
2010 808 40 2.08 8,651 451 37 5.60 4,237 
2011 769 39 2.10 8,456 450 39 5.65 4,453 
2012 763 38 2.11 7,151 440 32 5.61 3,867 
2013 (January-June) 539 31 2.11 2,598 340 26 5.66 1,773 
Full sample 2,341 118 2.16 156,955  1,931 110 5.65 113,976 
Notes: 
This table presents descriptive statistics on all UK sell-side analyst recommendations in the long and short portfolios in each year over the period January 1997 to June 
2013. All real-time analyst recommendations are obtained from Morningstar Company Intelligence, including information on the name of the firm recommended, the 
name of the brokerage house issuing the recommendation, the recommendation starting date and expiration date, and a rating between 1 and 9. A rating of 1 reflects a 
strong buy, 2 a buy, 3 a weak buy, 4 a weak buy/hold, 5 a hold, 6 a hold/sell, 7 a weak sell, 8 a sell, and 9 a strong sell. A long portfolio includes all upgrades to strong 
buy, buy, weak buy, or weak buy/hold from previous strong sell, sell, weak sell, hold/sell, or hold, while a short portfolio includes all downgrades to strong sell, sell, weak 





Table 55.1 presents descriptive statistics on analyst recommendation revisions in the long 
and short portfolios. The long portfolio includes 156,955 analyst recommendation revisions for 
2,341 stocks, while the short portfolio includes 113,976 analyst recommendation revisions for 
1,931 stocks. So, the number of analyst recommendation revisions in the long portfolio is 37.71% 
(156,955/113,976 –1) more than that in the short portfolio, in line with the argument that sell-side 
analysts tend to provide more coverage on positive recommendations (see, e.g., Stickel, 1995; 
Barber et al., 2001; Boni and Womack, 2006). 
55.3.2.2 Portfolio performance evaluation 
Like Barber et al. (2007), we assume an equal dollar investment in each revision, the return 
on portfolio p at date t, Rp,t, is: 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 = �∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=1 � ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=1� , (55.1) 
where nt represents the number of analyst recommendation revisions in the portfolio at the close of 
trading of the recommendation date through date t –1; xi,t represents the compounded daily return 
for the recommended stock i from the closing of trading on the recommendation date through date t 
–1 (xi,t = 1 for a stock recommended on date t –1); Ri,t represents the daily return for the 
recommended stock i on date t.  
The abnormal return is estimated using the intercept term, αp, derived from the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model:5 
𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡, (55.2) 
where Rp,t and Rm,t are the daily return on the portfolio and the FTSE All-Share Index, respectively; 
Rf,t represents the three-month UK T-bill rate; SMBt and HMLt represent the daily returns on zero-
investment factor-mimicking portfolios for size and book-to-market (B/M), respectively; εp,t 
represents the error term. We obtain the daily (Rm,t – Rf,t), SMBt, and HMLt in the UK stock market 
from the Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment at the University of Exeter (see, Gregory, Tharyan, 
and Christidis, 2013).  
We estimate Eq. (2) on a rolling window basis, i.e., a one-year window length rolling one 
trading day forward, to track the performance of the underlying variables over time. For example, 
the first rolling window is from January 2, 1997 to December 31, 1997, which covers 253 trading 
                                                             
5 We explicitly exclude the returns on the first trading day following the recommendation as many investors, 
particularly small investors, tend to react to information contained in analyst recommendation revisions with 
a delay (Barber et al., 2001). 
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days. The chosen length of a rolling window is one year in this study as average investors generally 
evaluate their portfolios on an annual basis (see, Benartzi and Thaler, 1995).Then the return for the 
first trading day is dropped and the return for a new trading day is added, meaning that the return 
for January 2, 1997 is dropped and the return for January 2, 1998 is added. This process continues 
so that we estimate a total of 3,912 rolling windows over the whole sample period. In each rolling 
window, the three-factor regression yields parameter estimates of αp, βp, sp, and hp; a statistically 
positive (negative) αp indicates that the long (short) portfolio is profitable after controlling for the 
risk factors of market, size, and value. This calculation, therefore, generates a time-series of daily 
abnormal returns for the long or short portfolio.  
55.3.3 Time-series bootstrapping simulation methods 
To study whether the time-varying abnormal returns to the long and short portfolios are due 
to random chance (i.e., sell-side analysts’ luck), we propose a time-series bootstrapping simulation 
method in the spirit of Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010). In particular, we 
employ two bootstrapping procedures, i.e., (i) Procedure I: Resampling the residuals independently 
with fixed common risk factors; and (ii) Procedure II: Jointly resampling both the residuals and 
common risk factors. 
55.3.3.1 Procedure I: Resampling the residuals independently with fixed common risk factors 
Like Kosowski et al. (2006), our first rolling window based bootstrapping simulation 
resamples the residuals from a time-series of returns independently, keeps the order of common 
risk factors fixed, and rolls the procedure forwards throughout a large number of windows. In this 
section, we demonstrate the time-series bootstrapping simulation method with the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model, but the application of the bootstrapping procedure to other asset pricing 
models, such as the CAPM, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and the Fama and French (2015) 
five-factor model, is very similar, with the only modification of the steps being the substitution of 
appropriate models. 
Specifically, the time-series bootstrapping simulation method includes five major steps as 
follows: 
(i) We estimate the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to calculate the estimated 
alphas, factor loadings, and residuals using the time-series of daily excess returns for the portfolio ��𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�, 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇1 , … ,𝑇𝑇253�, where T1 and T253 are the first and last trading dates, respectively, in 
each rolling window: 
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𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼� + ?̂?𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�+ ?̂?𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + ℎ�𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡 . (55.3) 
(ii) We save the coefficient estimates, �𝛼𝛼�𝑝𝑝, ?̂?𝛽𝑝𝑝, ?̂?𝑠𝑝𝑝,ℎ�𝑝𝑝�, the time-series of estimated residuals, 
{𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡 =  𝑇𝑇1 , … ,  𝑇𝑇253}, and the t-statistic of alpha, ?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼� . 
(iii) We generate a time-series of pseudo residuals �𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 =  𝑇𝑇1𝑏𝑏 , … ,𝑇𝑇253𝑏𝑏 � by randomly drawing 
the residuals from the saved residual vector {𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡} with replacements, where b is the bootstrapping 
simulation index. It is important to reiterate that only the residuals are reordered, while the 
common risk factors are not resampled, in line with the Kosowski et al. (2006). 
(iv) We produce a time-series of pseudo daily excess returns �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,𝑡𝑡�𝑏𝑏  in the rolling 
window, imposing the null hypothesis of zero true performance (α = 0): 
��𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�𝑏𝑏 = 0 + ?̂?𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏�𝑏𝑏 + ?̂?𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + ℎ�𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 �, (55.4) 
where 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇1 , … ,𝑇𝑇253;  𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 = 𝑇𝑇1𝑏𝑏 , … ,𝑇𝑇253𝑏𝑏  
(v) For the bootstrapping simulation index b = 1, we regress the pseudo daily excess returns �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,𝑡𝑡�𝑏𝑏on the three factors: 
�𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,𝑡𝑡�𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼�𝑏𝑏 + ?̂?𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,𝑡𝑡�+ ?̂?𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + ℎ�𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡. (55.5) 
The simulated 𝛼𝛼�𝑏𝑏  represents the sampling variation around zero true performance, purely 
due to random chance (luck). Repeating the above procedures forward by one observation each 
time, we yield a time-series of simulated alphas, �𝛼𝛼�𝑤𝑤,𝑏𝑏  𝑤𝑤 = 1,⋯ , 3,912�, and their corresponding t-
statistics, �?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 ,𝑤𝑤 = 1, … , 3,912�, where 𝑤𝑤 is the number of rolling windows throughout the full 
sample period January 1998 to June 2013. We then sort all simulated 𝛼𝛼�𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏  into a cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of simulated 𝛼𝛼�𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 , 𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼�𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 ), a separate time-series of luck distribution 
from the worst performing rolling window to the best performing rolling window. We repeat the 
above bootstrapping simulation a large number of times, say, b = 1, …, 10,000, generating a 
similar time-series distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics �?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 ,𝑤𝑤 = 1, … , 3,912; 𝑏𝑏 =
1, … , 10,000�, which can be compared with the distribution of the actual distribution �?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤 ,𝑤𝑤 =
1, … , 3,912�, once both sets of t-statistics have been resorted from the lowest value (?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) to the 
highest value (?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ).  
We compare the t-statistics rather than the alphas simply because the use of the t-statistics 
controls for differences in risk-taking across subsamples. The rationale behind the bootstrapping 
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simulations is to investigate the number of subsamples that one might expect to achieve a given 
level of abnormal returns by random chance alone and then compare this with the number of 
subsamples that actually achieve this level of abnormal returns in the ‘real world’. For the 
outperforming (underperforming) subsamples measured by t-statistics of alpha, if the simulated ?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏  is greater than the actual ?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  in less than 5% of the 10,000 simulations, at any given 
performance order, we reject the null hypothesis that the outperforming (underperforming) 
subsample is due to good luck (poor stock picking skill) at the 95% confidence level and infer that 
the strategy is genuine (bad luck) (see, Cuthbertson et al., 2008; Blake et al., 2017). The same rule 
can be applied for any other point in the CDF. 
Like Meyer et al. (2012), we do not account for autocorrelation for two reasons. First, the 
majority of rolling window regressions do not report autocorrelation at the conventional 
significance level using the Breusch-Godfrey test. Second, it has the advantage of enhancing 
comparability between simulated and actual t-statistics through a uniform test specification. This is 
because the bootstrap simulations consist of random drawings of individual daily returns with 
replacements, which means the time series drawn cannot contain any true underlying 
autocorrelation by design. We thus employ the robust standard errors that control for the 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) effect (see Appendix 55B). 
55.3.3.2 Procedure II: Jointly resampling both the residuals and common risk factors 
Motivated by Fama and French (2010), we repeat Procedure I by jointly resampling both the 
residuals and common risk factors in Step (iii), ceteris paribus. Specifically, in Step (iii), we 
generate two time-series of pseudo residuals �𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡𝑏𝑏 =  𝑇𝑇1𝑏𝑏 , … ,𝑇𝑇252𝑏𝑏 �  and risk factors ��𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 −𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,t�𝑏𝑏 ,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ,𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏� jointly by randomly drawing residuals and risk factors from the original 
residual vector {𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡}  and risk factor vector ��𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ,𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡�  with replacements, 
respectively. The major difference between the two bootstrapping procedures is that Procedure II 
considers the distribution of the residuals conditional on the realization of the systematic risk 
factors (see, Fama and French, 2010), while Procedure II employs the unconditional distribution of 
the residuals and assumes the influence of the common risk factors is not fixed at their historical 





Figure 55.1a. The time-varying average daily abnormal returns to the long portfolio and the 
corresponding t-statistics under the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, based on the 
whole sample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations 
 
Figure 55.1b. The time-varying average daily abnormal returns to the short portfolio and the 
corresponding t-statistics under the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, based on the 
whole sample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations 
Notes: 
Figure 55.1a (b) illustrates the time-varying average daily abnormal returns to the long (short) portfolio using 
the whole sample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations over the period January 1997 to June 2013. The 
long portfolio includes all upgrades to Strong Buy or Buy from previous Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold, while the 
short portfolio includes all downgrades to Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold from previous Strong Buy or Buy. For 
each analyst recommendation made by a brokerage house, the recommended stock enters the long or short 
portfolio at the close of trading on the day the recommendation is released, and remains in the portfolio until 
the close of trading on the day the recommendation expires. The abnormal return is estimated as the intercept 
term derived from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model on a one-year window length rolling one 
trading day forward. The reported abnormal returns in this section are the abnormal net returns adjusted by 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section, we first report the results for the average daily abnormal returns to the long 
and short portfolios, followed by the simulated results. The abnormal returns to the long and short 
portfolios are calculated as the gross abnormal returns less the estimated transaction costs 
multiplied by the corresponding daily portfolio turnover in each rolling window. We employ a 
relatively cautious estimate of the average round-trip transaction costs in the UK for purchasing 
stocks at 1.5% and for short selling stocks at 3.0% (see, e.g., Hudson et al., 1996; Ellis and Thomas, 
2004; Li, Brooks, and Miffre, 2010).6 Throughout this section, we present the results under the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, while our results remain qualitatively the same under 
the CAPM and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, ruling out the concern on a poor model of 
asset pricing raised by Barber et al. (2001). Our empirical and simulated results under the the 
CAPM and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model are not presented for the sake of brevity, but are 
available on request from the authors.  
55.4.1 Time-varying performance of the long and short portfolios 
Figure 55.1a (1b) shows the time-varying average daily abnormal returns to the long (short) 
portfolio and the corresponding t-statistics. Overall, we find that the abnormal returns to the long 
and short portfolios fluctuate over time during the whole sample period, while these positive or 
negative abnormal returns are not statistically significant at the conventional level. Specifically, the 
abnormal returns to the long portfolio range from –2.38 basis points (t-stat = –1.23) to 1.48 basis 
points (t-stat = 0.70), while the abnormal returns to the short portfolio range from –1.34 basis 
points (t-stat = –0.91) to 1.95 basis points (t-stat = 0.80). Our rolling window analysis results 
suggest that it is unlikely for investors to make profits either by purchasing stocks with positive 
revisions or by short selling stocks with negative revisions during any period of time. 
                                                             
6 Keim and Madhavan (1998) categorize transaction costs into explicit costs (e.g., brokerage commissions 
and taxes) and implicit costs (e.g., bid-ask spread and market impact of trading). Hudson et al. (1996) show 
that the total round-trip transaction costs in the UK stock market for the most favored of investors is upward 
of 1.0%, including government stamp duty of 0.5%, negotiated brokerage commission of 0.1% (soft 




Figure 55.2a. The time-varying average daily abnormal returns to the long portfolio and the 
corresponding t-statistics under the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, based on the 
subsample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations made exclusively by Top 5 brokerage houses 
Figure 55.2b. The time-varying average daily abnormal returns to the short portfolio and the 
corresponding t-statistics under the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, based on the 
subsample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations made exclusively by Top 5 brokerage houses 
Notes: 
Figure 55.2a (b) illustrates the time-varying average daily abnormal returns to the long (short) portfolio using 
the subsample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations made exclusively by Top 5 largest brokerage houses 
over the period January 1997 to June 2013. The Top 5 brokerage houses are identified by their three-year 
moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of positions on the annual All-European Research Team published by 
Institutional Investor. The long portfolio includes all upgrades to Strong Buy or Buy from previous Strong 
Sell, Sell, or Hold, while the short portfolio includes all downgrades to Strong Sell, Sell, or Hold from 
previous Strong Buy or Buy. For each analyst recommendation made by a brokerage house, the 
recommended stock enters the long or short portfolio at the close of trading on the day the recommendation 
is released, and remains in the portfolio until the close of trading on the day the recommendation expires. The 
abnormal return is estimated as the intercept term derived from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model on a one-year window length rolling one trading day forward. The reported abnormal returns in this 
section are the abnormal net returns adjusted by the round-trip transaction costs in the UK, i.e., 1.5% for 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































t-statistics of the average daily abnormal returns to the short portfolio
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Although a number of investment strategies based on analyst recommendation revisions fail 
to generate significant abnormal returns, Barber et al. (2001; p. 537) point out that “it remains an 
open question whether other types of trading strategies could be profitable”. A growing body of 
evidence shows that more prestigious brokerage houses have superior access to company managers 
and information; thus, their stock recommendations are supposed to be more readily available to 
investors (see, Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001; Hong and Kubrik, 2003; Green, 
2006; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006; Fang and Yasuda 2014). For the robustness purposes, we 
construct two alternative long and short portfolios, based on a subsample of 55,092 analyst 
recommendation revisions made exclusively by Top 5 brokerage houses, identified by their three-
year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of positions on the annual All-Europe Research Team 
published by Institutional Investor. For example, the ranking of each brokerage house in the 
calendar year of 1998 is determined based on its average position in the years of 1997, 1996, and 
1995. 7  Replicating all analyses in Figures 55.1a and 1b, we find that our results remain 
qualitatively the same (see Figures 55.2a & 2b). That is, investment strategies following UK sell-
side analyst recommendation revisions could not generate significant abnormal returns, 
irrespectively of whether these stock recommendations are made by sell-side analysts working for 
more or less prestigious brokerage houses. 
55.4.2 Bootstrapping simulations 
As our results suggest that sell-side analysts cannot provide valuable stock recommendation 
revisions, we further examine whether the observed insignificant abnormal returns are simply as a 
result of these analysts’ bad luck or their inferior skill (Fama, 1998; Barber et al., 2001). We 
compare any actual t-statistic of alpha with its appropriate luck distribution to distinguish whether 
sell-side analysts have sufficient skill in making valuable stock recommendations. Like, Kosowski 
et al. (2006), Barras et al. (2010), and Fama and French (2010), we focus on the distribution of the 
t-statistic of alpha rather than the actual alpha, as the t-statistic has superior statistical properties 
(see, Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross, 1992). Specifically, the t-statistic accounts for 
differences in the precision of alpha. Consider, for example, an investor who takes high risks or 
who only has a short time series of portfolio returns. That investor can more easily exhibit extreme 
estimated alphas, which, however, are likely to be spurious outliers. The t-statistic corrects for that 
by scaling the alphas by its standard errors. Through this rescaling, the t-statistic accounts even 
more generally for the differences in risk-taking and number of observations in the whole rolling 
                                                             
7 Su et al. (2018) provide a list of Top 5 brokerage houses based on their three-year moving average of 
positions on the annual All-Europe Research Team published by Institutional Investor over the period 1996 
to 2013. For each brokerage house in each year of t, its positions in previous three years (t –3, t –2, t –1) are 
shown in bracket.  
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windows. The time-series distribution of the t-statistic of alpha, therefore, has the statistically 
preferable attribute of being closer to a normal distributed than the time-series distribution of alpha. 
Therefore, we compare the t-statistics of alphas at selected percentiles of the CDF of the actual t-
statistics of alphas with the average of the 10,000 simulated t-statistics at the same percentiles. For 
the outperforming subsamples, if the simulated t-statistic is higher than the actual t-statistic in less 
than 5% of the 10,000 simulated t-statistics,8 we reject the null hypothesis that the abnormal return 
is due to luck at the 95% confidence level and infer that the outperforming subsamples show 
superior skill and vice versa (see, also, Berk and Green, 2004; Gallefoss et al., 2015). In this 
subsection, we focus on presenting the simulated results based on Procedure II (see Table 55.2), as 
the simulated results based on Procedure I (see Table 55.3) are quite similar, in line with the results 
shown in Gallefoss et al. (2015). 
Panel A of Table 55.2 shows the CDFs of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal returns and 
the average of the simulated CDFs for the long and short portfolios, based on the whole sample. 
The left side of Panel A shows that for the long portfolio, the actual t-statistics of the abnormal 
returns are always smaller than the corresponding average values from the simulations for all 
percentiles. For example, the left tail 5th and 10th percentiles of the actual t-statistics are −1.09 and 
−0.87, respectively, smaller than the corresponding average simulated values of −0.55 and −0.35. 
Similarly, the right tail 90th and 95th percentiles of the actual t-statistics are 0.77 and 0.98, 
respectively, smaller than the average simulated values of 0.92 and 1.08. For the outperforming 
subsamples, there are more than 30% of simulated t-statistics higher than the actual t-statistics. The 
simulated results clearly suggest sell-side analysts’ lack of skill in making valuable upward 
revisions for stocks that can generate significantly positive abnormal returns in any period of time. 
The right side of Panel A of Table 55.2 shows that, for the short portfolio, the left tail 
percentiles of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal returns are also below the corresponding 
average values from the simulations for all percentiles. For example, the 5th and 10th percentiles of 
the actual t-statistics are −1.06 and −0.75, respectively, much lower than the average simulated 
values of −0.60 and −0.30. Similarly, the right tail percentiles of the actual t-statistics confirm that 
sell-side analysts do not have certain skill in making valuable downward revisions in any period of 
time. For example, the 90th and 95th percentiles of the actual t-statistics are 1.01 and 1.18, 
respectively, smaller than the average simulated values of 1.28 and 1.45. Figure 55.3a (3b) 
illustrates the CDFs of the actual t-statistics of the abnormal returns and the corresponding average 
simulated CDFs for the long (short) portfolio, using the whole sample. 
                                                             
8 In this subsection, we present the performance of the short portfolio is measured as the signed abnormal 




Table 55.2 Percentiles of t-statistics for actual and simulated abnormal returns (Procedure I) 
 The long portfolio  The short portfolio 
% Simulated t-stat Actual t-stat % (Simulated > Actual)  Simulated t-stat Actual t-stat % (Simulated > Actual) 
Panel A: The whole sample 
1 –0.92 –1.48 0.20  –1.15 –1.47 0.23 
2 –0.75 –1.30 0.21  –0.92 –1.32 0.30 
3 –0.67 –1.21 0.23  –0.80 –1.22 0.49 
4 –0.61 –1.15 0.24  –0.70 –1.13 0.49 
5 –0.55 –1.09 0.24  –0.60 –1.06 0.81 
10 –0.35 –0.87 0.26  –0.30 –0.75 0.94 
20 –0.11 –0.56 0.27  0.08 –0.37 1.19 
30 0.04 –0.35 0.32  0.31 –0.13 1.85 
40 0.18 –0.19 0.53  0.48 0.04 2.71 
50 0.30 –0.04 1.02  0.62 0.18 4.34 
60 0.42 0.10 3.64  0.75 0.33 5.84 
70 0.55 0.27 4.20  0.89 0.51 7.23 
80 0.71 0.47 7.11  1.05 0.72 13.53 
90 0.92 0.77 12.02  1.28 1.01 26.95 
95 1.08 0.98 15.71  1.45 1.18 32.66 
96 1.12 1.03 30.84  1.50 1.22 36.13 
97 1.17 1.09 33.73  1.58 1.28 44.66 
98 1.25 1.18 38.89  1.70 1.35 46.56 
99 1.45 1.37 44.01  1.94 1.45 48.19 
Panel B: The subsample of UK analyst recommendations made by Top 5 brokerage houses 
1 –0.89 –1.45 0.20  –1.12 –1.44 0.23 
2 –0.72 –1.28 0.21  –0.89 –1.30 0.30 
3 –0.64 –1.19 0.23  –0.77 –1.20 0.49 
4 –0.59 –1.13 0.24  –0.67 –1.11 0.49 
5 –0.53 –1.07 0.24  –0.57 –1.04 0.80 
10 –0.33 –0.86 0.26  –0.27 –0.73 0.93 
20 –0.09 –0.55 0.27  0.10 –0.36 1.18 
30 0.05 –0.34 0.32  0.33 –0.12 1.83 
40 0.19 –0.19 0.53  0.49 0.05 2.68 
50 0.30 –0.05 1.01  0.63 0.18 4.30 
60 0.42 0.10 3.61  0.76 0.33 5.78 
70 0.55 0.27 4.16  0.89 0.51 7.16 
80 0.71 0.46 7.05  1.05 0.72 13.40 
90 0.91 0.76 11.92  1.28 1.00 26.68 
95 1.07 0.97 15.59  1.44 1.17 32.34 
96 1.11 1.01 30.63  1.49 1.21 35.77 
97 1.15 1.07 33.46  1.57 1.26 44.22 
98 1.23 1.16 38.58  1.68 1.33 46.10 
99 1.43 1.35 43.66  1.92 1.43 47.71 
Notes: 
This table presents the values of t-statistics at selected percentiles (%) of the distribution of t-statistics of the actual 
and simulated abnormal returns, as well as the percent of the 10,000 simulation runs that produce higher values of 
t-statistics at the selected percentiles than those actual abnormal returns (% Simulated > Actual), over the period 
January 1997 to June 2013. The abnormal return is estimated as the intercept term derived from the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model, either using the whole sample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations (in 
Panel A), or using the subsample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations made by Top 5 brokerage houses (in 
Panel B). The Top 5 brokerage houses are identified by their three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of 




We also report the simulated results using the subsample of analyst recommendation 
revisions made by Top 5 brokerage houses. Panel B of Table 55.2 shows that our subsample 
simulated results are qualitatively similar to those based on the whole sample, confirming that the 
reputation of brokerage houses does not matter. That is, on average, even sell-side analysts working 
for more prestigious brokerage houses in the UK have no sufficient skill to make valuable upward 
or downward revisions for stocks in any period of time. 
 
 
Figure 55.3a: Simulated and actual cumulative density function (CDF) of t-statistics for the 
abnormal returns to the long portfolio, under the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, using 
the whole sample 
 
 
Figure 55.3b: Simulated and actual cumulative density function (CDF) of t-statistics for the 
abnormal returns to the short portfolio, under the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, 




















































Table 55.3 Percentiles of t-statistics for actual and simulated abnormal returns (Procedure II) 
 The long portfolio  The short portfolio 
% Simulated t-stat Actual t-stat % (Simulated > Actual)  Simulated t-stat Actual t-stat % (Simulated > Actual) 
Panel A: The whole sample 
1 –0.88 –1.45 0.20  –1.10 –1.44 0.23 
2 –0.72 –1.28 0.21  –0.88 –1.29 0.30 
3 –0.64 –1.19 0.23  –0.76 –1.20 0.48 
4 –0.58 –1.13 0.24  –0.66 –1.11 0.48 
5 –0.52 –1.07 0.24  –0.57 –1.04 0.80 
10 –0.33 –0.86 0.26  –0.27 –0.73 0.93 
20 –0.10 –0.55 0.27  0.10 –0.36 1.17 
30 0.05 –0.35 0.32  0.33 –0.12 1.83 
40 0.19 –0.19 0.52  0.49 0.04 2.67 
50 0.29 –0.05 1.01  0.63 0.18 4.28 
60 0.42 0.10 3.59  0.76 0.33 5.76 
70 0.55 0.26 4.14  0.89 0.51 7.13 
80 0.70 0.46 7.01  1.05 0.71 13.35 
90 0.91 0.75 11.86  1.27 1.00 26.59 
95 1.06 0.96 15.50  1.43 1.16 32.23 
96 1.10 1.01 30.42  1.48 1.20 35.65 
97 1.15 1.07 33.27  1.56 1.26 44.07 
98 1.22 1.15 38.36  1.68 1.33 45.94 
99 1.42 1.34 43.41  1.92 1.43 47.55 
Panel B: The subsample of UK analyst recommendations made by Top 5 brokerage houses 
1 –0.84 –1.41 0.20  –1.07 –1.41 0.23 
2 –0.68 –1.25 0.21  –0.84 –1.27 0.30 
3 –0.60 –1.16 0.23  –0.73 –1.17 0.48 
4 –0.56 –1.11 0.24  –0.63 –1.09 0.48 
5 –0.50 –1.05 0.24  –0.53 –1.02 0.79 
10 –0.30 –0.84 0.26  –0.24 –0.71 0.92 
20 –0.07 –0.53 0.27  0.13 –0.34 1.16 
30 0.07 –0.33 0.32  0.35 –0.11 1.81 
40 0.20 –0.18 0.52  0.51 0.06 2.64 
50 0.31 –0.05 1.00  0.64 0.18 4.24 
60 0.42 0.10 3.57  0.77 0.33 5.70 
70 0.55 0.27 4.11  0.89 0.51 7.06 
80 0.71 0.45 6.97  1.05 0.71 13.22 
90 0.90 0.75 11.78  1.28 0.99 26.32 
95 1.06 0.95 15.42  1.43 1.16 31.90 
96 1.09 0.99 30.34  1.47 1.19 35.28 
97 1.13 1.05 33.09  1.55 1.24 43.62 
98 1.21 1.14 38.15  1.66 1.31 45.47 
99 1.40 1.32 43.18  1.90 1.41 47.06 
Notes: 
This table presents the values of t-statistics at selected percentiles (%) of the distribution of t-statistics of the actual 
and simulated abnormal returns, as well as the percent of the 10,000 simulation runs that produce higher values of 
t-statistics at the selected percentiles than those actual abnormal returns (% Simulated > Actual), over the period 
January 1997 to June 2013. The abnormal return is estimated as the intercept term derived from the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model, either using the whole sample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations (in 
Panel A), or using the subsample of UK sell-side analyst recommendations made by Top 5 brokerage houses (in 
Panel B). The Top 5 brokerage houses are identified by their three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of 






We examine the time-varying performance of investment strategies––the long and short 
portfolios––constructed following UK sell-side analyst recommendation revisions over the period 
January 1997 to June 2013. We find that the abnormal returns to the long and short portfolios are 
not statistically significant at the conventional level in any period of time. Importantly, we develop 
a time-series bootstrapping simulation method confirming that the observed statistically 
insignificant abnormal returns to the long and short portfolios are due to sell-side analysts’ lack of 
skill in making valuable stock recommendation revisions, rather than their bad luck. Our 
conclusions hold up fairly well with the use of an alternative subsample of analyst recommendation 
revisions exclusively made by sell-side analysts working for more prestigious brokerage houses 
under various single- and multi-factor asset pricing models. Our rolling window based 
bootstrapping simulation method can be applied in other time-series investment performance to 
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APPENDIX 55A DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON UK SELL-SIDE ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS 
This appendix presents descriptive statistics on 294,692 UK sell-side analyst recommendations in each year over the period January 1997 to June 2013. All 
real-time analyst recommendations are obtained from Morningstar Company Intelligence, including information on the name of the firm recommended, the 
name of the brokerage house issuing the recommendation, the recommendation starting date and expiration date, and a rating between 1 and 9. A rating of 1 


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  No. % No. % 
1997 975 45 24,770 3.75 459 10,556 1,638 487 9,295 247 364 1,515 209  13,140  53.05 11,630  46.95 
1998 1,021 47 25,074 3.77 732 9,853 2,704 426 8,580 147 886 1,448 298  13,715  54.70 11,359  45.30 
1999 985 45 21,842 3.65 672 8,898 2,786 254 7,121 105 739 1,037 230  12,610  57.73 9,232  42.27 
2000 931 50 18,189 3.43 752 7,892 2,551 185 5,509 85 426 656 133  11,380  62.57 6,809  37.43 
2001 939 45 16,687 3.94 369 6,153 1,832 228 5,750 77 768 1,436 74  8,582  51.43 8,105  48.57 
2002 911 44 15,052 3.93 343 5,942 1,420 235 4,713 137 778 1,461 23  7,940  52.75 7,112  47.25 
2003 867 48 17,666 3.87 211 7,420 1,630 331 5,498 41 868 1,631 36  9,592  54.30 8,074  45.70 
2004 885 50 20,609 3.82 208 8,722 2,198 213 6,521 22 957 1,735 33  11,341  55.03 9,268  44.97 
2005 956 52 21,511 3.98 213 8,326 2,317 96 7,264 140 1,018 2,083 54  10,952  50.91 10,559  49.09 
2006 1,000 54 20,186 3.72 255 9,125 2,152 6 6,019 20 974 1,620 15  11,538  57.16 8,648  42.84 
2007 977 51 15,560 3.59 92 7,632 1,648 4 4,463 6 587 1,126 2  9,376  60.26 6,184  39.74 
2008 963 53 16,117 3.66 119 8,268 1,047 142 4,370 2 517 1,652 0  9,576  59.42 6,541  40.58 
2009 856 53 17,686 3.72 147 8,625 1,231 227 5,148 0 495 1,791 22  10,230  57.84 7,456  42.16 
2010 834 40 13,821 3.32 199 7,834 997 83 3,584 0 221 902 1  9,113  65.94 4,708  34.06 
2011 804 40 13,636 3.38 195 7,522 1,002 117 3,604 0 217 978 1  8,836  64.80 4,800  35.20 
2012 805 40 11,694 3.41 104 6,442 815 135 3,196 0 140 862 0  7,496  64.10 4,198  35.90 
2013 (Jan.–Jun.) 613 31 4,562 3.62 0 2,361 309 20 1,432 0 42 428 0  2,690  58.58 1,902  41.42 





APPENDIX 55B: STATA CODES FOR THE TIME-SERIES BOOTSTRAPPING 
SIMULATIONS 
Our bootstrapping simulations can be conducted by the main body of the Stata codes (bs_resid.do 
and bs_resid.ado) with a loop function.9 Specifically, the .do file is a text file containing commands 
to execute the commands stored in the .ado file, which could be downloaded and saved in a folder 
under the personal directory, along with the corresponding help file (.hlp) in the same folder. In 
this appendix, we detail the bootstrapping simulation method under the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model, but the application of the bootstrapping procedure to other asset pricing models, 
e.g., the CAPM, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, the Fama and French (2015) five-factor 
model, and so on, is very similar, with the only modification of the steps being the substitution of 
appropriate models.  
The Stata .ado file, bs_resid.ado, for Procedure I: Resampling the residuals independently with 
fixed common risk factors––Kosowiski et al. (2006) bootstrapping simulations 
program bs_resid 
version 13.1 
syntax, RESidual(varname numeric) MATrix(name) 
Step (i): The time-series daily excess portfolio returns (Rt – Rf,t) of the portfolio are regressed 
on the Fama and French (1993) three factors (Rt – Rf,t, SMBt, and HMLt) in each rolling 
window, to calculate the estimated alphas (𝛼𝛼�), factor loadings (?̂?𝛽, ?̂?𝑠,ℎ�), and residuals (𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡). 
Specifically, Rt and Rm,t are the daily return of the portfolio and the FTSE All-Share Index, 
respectively; Rf,t represents the three-month UK T-bill rate; SMBt and HMLt represent the 
daily returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios for size and B/M, respectively. 
The daily (Rm,t – Rf,t), SMBt, and HMLt in the UK stock market are collected from the Xfi 
Centre for Finance and Investment at the University of Exeter (see, Gregory et al., 2013). 
The excess return of portfolio and risk factors for the Fama and French three-factor model 
will be specified in the .do file, bs_resid.do (see descriptive statistics and correlations of 
various factor returns in Appendix 55C). 
local xvars : colna `matrix' 
local CONS _cons 
                                                             
9 The main body of our Stata codes are developed by Jeff Pitblado at StataCorp LP. This is a sample for 
demonstration purpose only. 
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local xvars : list xvars – CONS 
Step (ii): For each loop (i.e., each rolling window), we save the coefficient estimates �𝛼𝛼�𝑝𝑝, ?̂?𝛽𝑝𝑝, ?̂?𝑠𝑝𝑝,ℎ�𝑝𝑝�, the time-series of estimated residuals (𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡), and the t-statistic of the intercept 
(?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼�), generated from Step (i). 
tempvar xb idx y 
matrix score double `xb' = `matrix' 
Step (iii): We randomly select the residuals from the saved residual vector {𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡} in Step (ii), 
with replacements, in attempts to prepare for a time-series of the pseudo residuals �𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 � in 
the next step.  
gen long `idx' = ceil(_N*runiform()) 
Step (iv): Using the pseudo time-series of residuals �𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 � and fixed time-series of risk factors �?̂?𝛽𝑝𝑝, ?̂?𝑠𝑝𝑝 ,ℎ�𝑝𝑝�, we generate a time-series of pseudo daily excess returns �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�𝑏𝑏 in each 
rolling window; the time-series of pseudo excess returns impose the null hypothesis of zero 
true performance (α = 0). In this step, we only record the residuals rather than resampling the 
common risk factors, according to Kosowski et al. (2006). 
gen double `y' = `xb' + `residual'[`idx'] 
regress `y' `xvars', vce(robust) 
Step (v): We regress the pseudo daily excess returns �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�𝑏𝑏 generated from Step (iv) 
against the Fama and French (1993) three factors used in Step (i), generating the simulated 𝛼𝛼�𝑏𝑏, which represents the sampling variation around zero true performance, purely due to 
random chance (i.e., sell-side analysts’ luck). We repeat the above procedures in each rolling 
window and generate a time-series of simulated alphas, {𝛼𝛼�𝑤𝑤 𝑏𝑏 }, and their corresponding t-
statistics, �?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 �, where 𝑤𝑤 is the number of rolling windows, throughout the whole sample 
period. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity through the Newey–West 
procedure with 0 lag.  
End 
All simulated 𝛼𝛼�𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏  are then sorted into a CDF of the simulated 𝛼𝛼�𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 , 𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼�𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 ), a separate time-
series of luck distribution from the worst performing rolling window to the best performing 
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rolling window. We repeat the above bootstrapping procedure a large number of times, say, 
b = 1, …, 10,000, thus generating a similar time-series distribution of bootstrapped t-
statistics �?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 �, which can be compared with the distribution of the actual distribution �?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤�, 
once both sets of t-statistics have been resorted from the lowest value (?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚) to the highest 
value (?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚). For the outperforming (underperforming) subsamples measured by t-statistics 
of alpha, if the simulated ?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏  is greater than the actual ?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  in less than 5% of the 10,000 
simulations, at any given performance order, we reject the null hypothesis that the 
outperforming (underperforming) subsample is due to good luck (poor stock picking skill) at 
the 95% confidence level and infer that the strategy is genuine (bad luck). 
 
The Stata .ado file, bs_resid.ado, for Procedure II: Jointly resampling both the residuals and 
common risk factors––Fama and French (2010) bootstrapping simulations 
Precodure II repeats Procedure I by jointly resampling both the residuals and the common 
risk factors generated in Step (iii), ceteris paribus. The major difference between the two 
bootstrapping procedures is that Procedure II considers the distribution of the residuals 
conditional on the realization of the systematic risk factors (see, e.g., Fama and French, 
2010). Also, Procedure II employs the unconditional distribution of the residuals and 
assumes that the influence of the common risk factors is not fixed at their historical 
realizations (see, e.g., Kosowski et al., 2006). 
program bs_resid 
version 13.1 
syntax, RESidual(varname numeric) MATrix(name) 
Step (i): The time-series daily excess portfolio returns (Rt – Rf,t) of the portfolio are regressed 
on the Fama and French (1993) three factors (Rt – Rf,t, SMBt, and HMLt) in each rolling 
window, to calculate the estimated alphas (𝛼𝛼�), factor loadings (?̂?𝛽, ?̂?𝑠,ℎ�), and residuals (𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡). 
Specifically, Rt and Rm,t are the daily return of the portfolio and the FTSE All-Share Index, 
respectively; Rf,t represents the three-month UK T-bill rate; SMBt and HMLt represent the 
daily returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios for size and B/M, respectively. 
The daily (Rm,t – Rf,t), SMBt, and HMLt in the UK stock market are collected from the Xfi 
Centre for Finance and Investment at the University of Exeter (see, Gregory et al., 2013). 
The excess return of portfolio and risk factors for the Fama and French three-factor model 
will be specified in the .do file, bs_resid.do. 
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local xvars : colna `matrix' 
local CONS _cons 
local xvars : list xvars – CONS 
Step (ii): For each loop (i.e., each rolling window), we save the coefficient estimates �𝛼𝛼�𝑝𝑝, ?̂?𝛽𝑝𝑝, ?̂?𝑠𝑝𝑝,ℎ�𝑝𝑝�, the time-series of estimated residuals (𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡), and the t-statistic of the intercept 
(?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼�), generated from the Step (i). 
tempvar xb idx y 
matrix score double `xb' = `matrix' 
Step (iii): We randomly select the observations from the saved residual vector {𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡} and the 
risk factor vectors �?̂?𝛽𝑝𝑝, ?̂?𝑠𝑝𝑝,ℎ�𝑝𝑝�in Step (ii), with replacements, in attempts to prepare for a 
time-series of the pseudo residuals �𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 �  and a time-series of the pseudo risk factors ��𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏�𝑏𝑏 ,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ,𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 � in the next step. 
gen long `idx' = ceil(_N*runiform()) 
Step (iv): Using the pseudo time-series of residuals and fixed time-series of risk factors, we 
generate a time-series of pseudo daily excess returns �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ,𝑡𝑡�𝑏𝑏 in each rolling window; 
the time-series of pseudo excess returns impose the null hypothesis of zero true performance 
(α = 0). We resample both the residuals and the common risk factors, according to Fama and 
French (2010). Specifically, we randomly select the residuals from the saved residual vector 
{𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡} in Step (ii), with replacements. Similarly, we generate the pseudo time-series of risk 
factors by randomly collecting values with replacement from the original risk factor vectors ��𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ,𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡�. 
gen double `y' = `xb'[`idx'] + `residual'[`idx'] 
regress `y' `xvars', vce(robust) 
Step (v): We regress the pseudo daily excess returns �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�𝑏𝑏 generated from Step (iv) 
against the Fama and French (1993) three factors used in Step (i), generating the simulated 𝛼𝛼�𝑏𝑏, which represents the sampling variation around zero true performance, purely due to 
random chance (i.e., sell-side analysts’ luck). We repeat the above procedures in each rolling 
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window and generate a time-series of simulated alphas, {𝛼𝛼�𝑤𝑤 𝑏𝑏 }, and their corresponding t-
statistics, �?̂?𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 �, where 𝑤𝑤 is the number of rolling windows, throughout the whole sample 
period. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity through the Newey–West 
procedure with 0 lag. 
end 
 
The Stata do file, “bs_resid.do”, for bootstrapping simulation 
set seed 12345 
regress Rpt_Rft Rm_Rf SMBt HMLt, vce(robust) 
The daily excess portfolio returns (i.e., the difference between the daily return of the 
portfolio and the three-month UK T-bill rate) are regressed on the Fama and French (1993) 
three factors (i.e., the difference between the FTSE All-Share Index and the three-month UK 
T-bill rate, as well as the daily returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios for 
size and B/M. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity through the Newey–
West procedure with 0 lag. 
matrix b = e(b) 
The b matrix contains the coefficients from the original regression. This matrix is used to 
generate the list of independent variables stored in the macro xvars, which is a place where 
we can hold a piece of text including numeric as well as alphabetic characters, and then to 
produce/simulate a new dependent variable with the resampled residuals. 
local icons = colnumb(b, "_cons") 
matrix b[1,`icons'] = 0 
The time-series of pseudo excess returns impose the null hypothesis of zero true performance 
(α = 0). 
predict double resid, residuals 
histogram resid 
simulate _b _se, reps(10000) : bs_resid, res(resid) mat(b) 
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We use the bs_resid.do file to execute the bs_resid.ado file for the corresponding 
bootstrapping simulation methods. Specifically, _b represents the coefficient on risk factor; 
_se represents the standard error; reps() specifies the number of replications to be performed, 




APPENDIX 55C: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS FOR THE DAILY RISK 
FACTOR RETURNS 
This appendix presents descriptive statistics (in Panel A) and correlation (in Panel B) of the daily 
risk factor returns in the UK stock market over the period January 1997 to June 2015. Mean and 
Std. Dev. are the mean and standard deviation of the daily returns; Min and Max are the minimum 
and maximum of the daily returns; t-statistic is the ratio of the mean return over its standard error. 
*** stands for the statistical significance at the 1% level. We obtain the daily (Rm,t – Rf,t), SMBt, and 
HMLt in the UK stock market from the Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment at the University of 
Exeter, available at https://goo.gl/oDGL47 (see, Gregory et al., 2013). In the construction of the 
factors and test portfolios, Gregory et al., (2013) only include stocks in the Main Market of the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and exclude financials, foreign companies, and stocks listed in the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Rm,t – Rf,t represents the market factor (market risk premium); 
Rm,t represents the total return on the FTSE All-Share Index, and Rf,t represents the risk free rate, the 
return on three month Treasury Bills.  
The size (SMB) and vaule (HML) factors are constructed from six portfolios formed on size (market 
capitalization) and value/growth (B/M). Gregory et al. (2013) independently sort the sample firms 
on market capitalization and B/M at the beginning of October in each year. Sorting on market 
capitalization first, Gregory et al., (2013) form two size groups: small (S) and big (B) using the 
median market capitalization of the largest 350 companies in each year as the break point. Then, 
sorting on B/M, Gregory et al., (2013) form the three B/M groups: High (H), medium (M), and 
Low (L), using the 30th and 70th of the 350 firms as break points. Using two size and three BTM 
portfolios, Gregory et al., (2013) form six intersecting portfolios: SH (small size and high B/M 
portfolio), SM (small size and medium B/M portfolio), SL (small size and low B/M portfolio), BH 
(big size and high B/M portfolio), BM (big size and medium B/M portfolio), and BL (big size and 
low B/M portfolio). These portfolios are then used to form the SMB and HML factors. Specifically, 
SMB = (SL + SM + SH)/3 – (BL + BM + BH)/3 and HML = (SH + BH)/2 – (SL + BL)/2. 
 Rm,t – Rf,t (%) SMBt (%) HMLt (%) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Mean 0.02 –0.00 0.01 
Std. Dev. 1.18 0.80 0.70 
Min. –8.36 –6.30 –4.19 
Max. 9.20 3.56 5.78 
t-statistic 0.93 –0.06 0.94 
Panel B: Correlations 
 Rm,t – Rf,t SMBt HMLt 
Rm,t – Rf,t 1.00   
SMBt –0.54*** 1.00  
HMLt 0.09*** –0.01 1.00 
 
